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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Plaintiff/Appellant PDC Consulting Inc. (hereafter "PDC") filed its Notice of
Appeal on October 5, 2006. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)0) and 4, Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the district court properly act within its discretion when it dismissed PDC' s
complaint after PDC failed to oppose a motion to dismiss and after PDC had failed, within
the dates and extensions given by the court, to renew its denied motion to set aside the
parties' April 15, 2001 settlement agreement?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court's dismissal of a case under Rule 41(b) is a decision within the
broad discretion of the trial court. Country Meadows v. Dep 't of Health, 851 P.2d 1212,1215
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368,1370
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). See also, Grundmann v. Williams &
Peterson, 685 P.2d 538, 538 (Utah 1984). An appellate court, therefore, "will not interfere
with that decision unless it clearly appears that the court has abused its discretion and that
there is a likelihood an injustice has been wrought." Country Meadows, at 1214 (quoting
Charlie Brown Constr., at 1370 (citing Department of Soc. Serv. v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323,
1324 (Utah 1980)). The issue was preserved in the district court as evidenced in R. 732.
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APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following State of Utah statutory provisions are relevant to the disposition
of this appeal:
Rule 41, Utah R. Civ. P., provides in pertinent part:
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a
defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against
him....
Rule 7(c)(1), Utah R. Civ. P., provides in pertinent part:
Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in
opposition.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff PDC filed suit on April 6, 2001 alleging claims against its former
employee, defendant Jared Porter. The parties entered into a lengthy written and signed
settlement agreement nine days later, April 15, 2001. The settlement agreement secured
release of Mr. Porter and dismissal of PDC's case, in exchange for disclosures by Porter.
PDC apparently believed that such disclosures would enable it to file and pursue claims
against corporate entities.
After Mr. Porter made full disclosure, including submitting to fourteen hours
of deposition by PDC, PDC was disappointed that the disclosures did not support the claims
it had hoped to pursue against others. PDC then alleged to the court that Jared Porter had
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induced PDC into settlement by fraud and indicated its desire to proceed with its underlying
lawsuit against Mr. Porter. However, the court explained, and PDC agreed that the lawsuit
had been eclipsed by the settlement. PDC would first have to secure an order setting aside
the settlement before it would be able to proceed with its lawsuit.
Twenty-one months then passed without any motion by PDC to challenge the
settlement. Tired of the matter lingering on and desiring the dismissal of the case to which
PDC had agreed in the settlement, Mr. Porter moved to enforce the settlement agreement,
submitting proof of his compliance with all settlement terms. PDC responded by finally
filing a motion to set aside the settlement and submitting its counsel's affidavit to raise issues
about Mr. Porter's fulfillment of settlement terms. The court denied the motions, finding
disputed issues of fact, and telling the parties that resolution of the issues would require
hiring of experts and a lengthy evidentiary hearing. The court also noted that the case had
been inactive for over 2 years, even though PDC had claimed that material breaches of the
settlement agreement by Mr. Porter had occurred in June and July 2001. The court noted that
PDC had offered no explanation for its delay.
Subsequently, PDC did nothing on the case to set aside the settlement
agreement, contrary to court-established deadlines for challenging the settlement. Five years
after the case had settled, defendant Porter then filed a motion to dismiss for PDC's failures
to prosecute the case and challenge the settlement agreement within the deadlines established
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by the court. PDC did not oppose the motion to dismiss, and on September 6,2006 the court
dismissed the case with prejudice.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The material course of proceedings is as follows:
April 6, 2001

PDC files a complaint and a motion for temporary restraining
order ("TRO") against its former employee, defendant Jared
Porter, alleging various claims arising out of PDC's employment
of Mr. Porter. RR. 34-1, 217-15.

April 15, 2001

Following replevin of Jared Porter's personal laptop computer
and other property, PDC and Jared Porter execute a settlement
agreement securing release of Porter and dismissal of PDC's
lawsuit through Porter's cooperation in making disclosures,
including disclosure of other entities that PDC might be able to
sue. RR. 671-654.

June 14, 2001

Jared Porter submits to seven hours of deposition in fulfillment
of the terms of the settlement agreement. R. 670 f 7.

June 18,2001

PDC's counsel appears at a rescheduled TRO hearing, of which
defense counsel was not given notice. PDC's counsel tells the
court, "We were in depositions last Thursday on this matter. We
have a settlement probably I think. But I want to go ahead and
set it for an evidentiary hearing." R. 736, p. 3:14-16. The court
sets a hearing for August 14, 2001. RR. 302, 303.

June 29, 2001

Jared Porter submits to an additional seven hours of deposition
in fulfillment of the terms of the settlement agreement. R. 670

17.
August 14, 2001

Upon learning of the parties' settlement at the hearing set by
PDC, the court states there is no purpose for an evidentiary
hearing, since the case has settled. R. 737 p. 24:14-25:19,
36:22-37:2, 52:24-53:8. Having failed to find other entities to
sue, PDC expresses an intent to challenge the settlement
agreement. R. 737, 7:21-23. PDC acknowledges that the
settlement agreement governs and that PDC cannot proceed on
-4-

its lawsuit unless and until PDC gets the settlement set aside.
R. 737 p. 24:14-25:19, 36:22-37:2, 52:24-53:8.
August 14, 2001May 9, 2003

Over the following twenty-one months PDC fails to make any
motion to set aside or otherwise challenge the settlement
agreement.

April 9, 2003

Tired of the matter lingering on and desiring the dismissal to
which PDC had agreed in the settlement, Jared Porter moves to
enforce the settlement agreement and submits proof of his full
compliance with all settlement terms. RR. 310, 338, 428.

May 10,2003

PDC responds to Jared Porter's motion by filing a motion to set
aside the settlement agreement and attaching an affidavit of
plaintiffs counsel to dispute defendant's fulfillment of
settlement obligations. RR. 366, 373, 387.

November 3,2003

The court issues a ruling denying the parties' motions in regard
to the settlement and states, "It is this Court's opinion that a
lengthy evidentiary hearing is probably implicated, that experts
would need to be employed, and that each party might need to
seek new legal counsel."1 R. 612. Significantly, the court also
notes,
This case has been inactive for over 2 years even
though plaintiff claims that material breeches of
the settlement agreement by defendant occurred
as early as June and July of 2001. Plaintiff has
offered no explanation for this delay.
R. 615, If 2.

November 4, 2003November 29, 2004

The following year, PDC again makes no effort to challenge the
settlement.

November 30, 2004

The court holds an order to show cause hearing requiring the
parties to appear and show cause why the case should not be

]

The court stated this because Mr. Ady and defendant's prior attorney, Jack Pate, were
material witnesses to compliance with settlement terms. RR 552, 671.
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dismissed. R. 624. The court orders that the parties have 90
days to conduct discovery on settlement issues and then file "any
and all dispositive motions in regard to their settlement
agreement." R. 630.
November 30, 2004February26,2005

PDC does nothing during the 90-day settlement discovery and
challenge period. R. 732, p. 6:1-8.

February 27,2005

PDC requests that Jared Porter stipulate to an additional 60-day
settlement discovery period, until April 30, 2005, to which Mr.
Porter agrees. PDC Addendum B, R.732, 6:9-14, R. 632.

February 27, 2005April 30, 2005

PDC again does nothing during the additional 60-day period and
never renews its motion to set aside the parties' settlement
agreement. PDC Addendum B, R.732,6:9-14.

April 30, 2005April 3, 2006

PDC does nothing on the case.

April 4,2006

The court again holds an order to show cause hearing requiring
the parties to appear and show cause why the case should not be
dismissed. R. 637. PDC's counsel attends. The court
mistakenly believes that the parties have stipulated through
April 30, 2006 to file dispositive motions on the settlement,
when the extension had actually expired one-year prior to that
time. PDC Addendum B, R. 732 pp. 20,22, PDC Addendum A,
R. 733, p. 6, R. 632. The court orders submission of a new
scheduling order or a certificate of readiness for trial by April
30, 2006 or the case will be dismissed. PDC Addendum A, R.
733, p. 6. (Emphasis added).

April 28,2006

Even though PDC had never again attempted to obtain an order
setting aside the settlement agreement, and even though there
has been no litigation of PDC's claims, PDC files a certificate
of readiness for trial. R. 643.

May 8,2006

Defendant objects to PDC's certificate of readiness for trial and
moves to dismiss the case since PDC failed to challenge the
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settlement within the time and extensions of time given by the
court to challenge the settlement. RR. 682-644. Defendant
serves the motion to dismiss on May 8, 2006 by both U.S. mail
and by facsimile. RR. 673, 683, 684, 685.
June 6,2006

PDC fails to respond to Jared Porter's motion to dismiss and
Porter submits the motion for decision, asking the court to
dismiss the case since plaintiff has filed no opposition to the
motion. R. 689. That request to submit for decision was served
on the Plaintiff, also on June 6, 2006. R. 687.

July 3, 2006

Nearly two months have passed and PDC still files no
opposition to the motion to dismiss. The court schedules a
hearing for August 10, 2006 on the motion to dismiss. R. 692.

August 9,2006

Three months have now elapsed since defendant filed his motion
to dismiss and PDC still has filed no opposition.

August 10,2006

The court hears the parties' arguments on the motion to dismiss
and dismisses the case because PDC had been given plenty of
time and opportunity, but failed to challenge the settlement,
and because PDC failed to oppose defendant's motion to
dismiss. PDC Addendum A, R. 732, 19:13-24:8.

September 6, 2006

The court enters an order dismissing plaintiffs complaint with
prejudice for the reasons stated by the court in the August 10,
2006 hearing, including that plaintiff had failed to prosecute the
case, plaintiff had failed to timely renew its denied motion to set
aside the parties' April 15,2001 settlement agreement within the
dates and extensions given by court and opposing counsel, and
plaintiff had failed to timely oppose defendant's motion to
dismiss. PDC Addendum C, R. 730-729: PDC Addendum A, R.
732, 19:13-24:8.
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
Defendants' motion to dismiss was based on the fact that the case had

settled on April 15, 2001 and, while PDC had expressed a desire to challenge the parties'
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settlement agreement, PDC had failed to take action within the time and time extensions
provided by the court for PDC to attempt to set the settlement aside. RR. 689-683,682-644.
2.

In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court first dealt with the question

of the order-to-show-cause hearing on April 4,2006. PDC Addendum B, R. 732,19:19-24.
3.

The court noted that defense counsel, Mr. Raty, had mistakenly gone to

the Prove courthouse, but this was not significant, because counsel who has no objection to
the case being dismissed, need not appear. Id. 20:1-6.
4.

The court noted that it had reviewed the case file in preparation for the

August 10, 2006 motion to dismiss hearing, and stated that at the April 4, 2006 order-toshow-cause hearing the court had been under the mis-impression that the parties' stipulation
for continuance of settlement discovery was still in effect, when the extension had actually
expired nearly one year prior to that time. Id. 20:7-12, 22:18-25, R. 733, p. 6, R. 632.
5.

The court's mis-impression is revealed in the following language from

the April 4, 2006 hearing:
Okay. And then there's an extension, there's an agreement for an
extension of time to April 30th in the file, 2005. So looks like you've
agreed to, to that you have time a, until April 30th to complete
discovery. That a, stipulated extension remains in place. And a, I'll
order that a notice of readiness for trial be filed after that. Sounds like
you have some more time. Then if I don't receive a certificate of
readiness for trial or some other scheduling order by April 30th the case
will be dismissed.
PDC Addendum A, R. 733, p. 6. (emphasis added).
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6.

Then at the August 10,2006 motion-to-dismiss hearing, the court said,

''Unfortunately, that series of events required the defendant to file the present motion to
address matters that were unable, he was unable to present at the order to show cause
hearing." PDC Addendum A, Id. 20:7-16.
7.

The court noted that PDC had filed no timely response to defendant's

motion to dismiss, but the court had scheduled an unopposed motion to dismiss for hearing
"to give both parties an opportunity to appear and to discuss the issues that could have been
presented at the order to show cause hearing in April of 2006 but were not because of a,
counsel's traveling to the wrong courtroom by mistake." Id. 20:17-25.
8.

After the parties had argued, the court again noted that it had reviewed

the case history, including that the complaint was filed in April 2001, the parties reached a
written settlement agreement on April 15, 2001, that defendant submitted to a lengthy
deposition pursuant to the settlement agreement, and that approximately two years then
passed before motions were made on the settlement, whereupon Judge Davis ruled on
November 2003 that, "A lengthy evidentiary hearing is probably implicated, that experts
would need to be employed, and that each party might need to seek new legal counsel." Id.
21:1-18. The court also quoted Judge Davis' ruling, stating,
This case has been inactive for over 2 years even though plaintiff
claims that material breeches of the settlement agreement by defendant
occurred as early as June and July of 2001. Plaintiff has offered no
explanation for this delay.
Id. 22:1-6, R. 615, U 2.
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9.

The court noted that the next hearing occurred a little more than one

year later on November 30,2004, after the case had been reassigned, when the court issued
an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. PDC
Addendum B, R. 732, 22:7-11. At that time, the court ordered that any and all dispositive
motions relating to the settlement agreement be filed within 90 days of November 30,2004,
which period was extended by counsel for an additional 60 days to April 30,2005. Id. 22:11 14.
10.

The court then noted that another order-to-show-cause hearing was

scheduled for April 4, 2006, one year after the April 30, 2005 expiration of the extended
deadline for dispositive motions on the settlement agreement, and, again, that the court was
under the misknpression that the stipulated extension ran to April 30, 2006. Id. 22:18-22.
The court stated that because of its misimpression, it had ordered that plaintiff file a
scheduling order or a certificate of readiness for trial. Id. 22:20-25.
11.

The court then noted the arguments of the parties, including defendant's

argument that plaintiff had ample opportunity to challenge the settlement agreement, that the
court and defendant had granted extensions to the plaintiff to allow the settlement to be
challenged, but that plaintiff had failed to challenge the settlement agreement. Id. 23:1-11.
The court also noted plaintiffs argument that granting the motion to dismiss would, in effect,
grant a viability to the settlement agreement, when Judge Davis had previously ruled that
genuine issues of fact would preclude such a ruling. Id. 23:12-18. The court noted
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defendant's reply, that it had never been the defendant's burden to challenge the settlement
agreement, that it has always been defendant's view that the settlement agreement was in
place, and that it was the burden of the party seeking to set aside the settlement agreement
to gather any discovery on the matter and then move to set it aside. Id. 23:19-24:1.
12,

Having reviewed the file and considered the parties' arguments, the

court entered an order on September 6,2006, dismissing Plaintiff s complaint with prejudice
for the reasons stated by the court in the August 10,2006 hearing, including that plaintiff had
failed to prosecute the case, plaintiff had failed to timely renew its denied motion to set aside
the parties' April 15, 2001 settlement agreement within the dates and extensions given by
court and opposing counsel, and plaintiff had failed to timely oppose defendant's motion to
dismiss. Id. 24:2-5; PDC Addendum C, R. 730-729.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court has broad discretion in dismissing a case under Rule 41(b),
Utah R. Civ. P. for failure to prosecute, abide by court order, or abide the the rules of civil
procedure. The court dismissed PDC's complaint for failing to challenge the settlement
within the time allotted by the court, for failing to prosecute its case, and for failing to oppose
a motion to dismiss. On appeal of a Rule 41 (b) motion to dismiss, the appellant must carry
the burden of showing justifiable excuse for the failures leading to dismissal, and show that
the district court clearly abused its broad discretion. PDC has failed to carry its burdens on
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appeal, since it offered no excuses for its failures, and since it did not demonstrate a clear
abuse of the district court's broad discretion.
PDC could not have met its burden on appeal even had it tried, since the record
reveals ample grounds to support the district court's exercise of discretion in dismissing the
case. The parties entered into a settlement agreement shortly after PDC filed suit on April
6, 2001. Thereafter, PDC agreed with the court that it would have to obtain a court order
setting aside the settlement, if it wanted to proceed with the lawsuit underlying the
settlement. PDC failed to prosecute its challenge to the settlement and failed to obtain a
court order setting aside the settlement within the time allotted by the court. Five years after
the settlement, Mr. Porter moved to dismiss the case with prejudice for PDC's failures to
timely challenge the settlement and prosecute its case. The motion was unopposed by PDC
and the court properly entered dismissal on September 6, 2006.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ACTED WITHIN
ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PDC'S COMPLAINT
FOR FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT AND PROSECUTE THE CASE,
The real issue before the court is whether the district court properly acted
within its discretion in dismissing PDC's complaint under Rule 41(b), Utah R. Civ. P., as a
result of PDC's failure to timely oppose Jared Porter's motion to dismiss, its failure to
challenge the parties' settlement agreement within the times and extensions given by the
-12-

court, and its failure to prosecute its case. Rule 41(b), Utah R. Civ. P., states in pertinent
part,
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or
any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or
any claim of action against him.
Regarding the district court's authority to dismiss a case under Rule 41(b), the
supreme court has stated, "[T]he trial court should have a reasonable latitude of discretion
in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a party fails to move forward according to the rules
and directions of the court, without justifiable excuse." Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v.
Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 878-79 (Utah 1975). Under appellate court
precedents, the appellant, in this case PDC has the burden on appeal to show a justifiable
excuse for the failures that led to dismissal and that the court clearly abused its discretion in
dismissing the case. Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109 at ^[28 , 46 P.3d 753, Country
Meadows, at 1214-15, Morton v. Continental Baking Company, 938 P.2d271 (Utah 1997),
Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). The Utah Court of Appeals stated, "The
burden is on the party 'attacking a dismissal for failure to prosecute [to] offer a reasonable
excuse for its lack of diligence."5 Country Meadows, at 1215. In the case at bar, PDC has
failed to provide any excuse for its failures and also failed to show that the court clearly
abused its discretion. Furthermore, PDC could not show this, since there is ample evidence
in the record which establishes that the district court acted properly within its discretion in
dismissing the case.
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As set forth above, PDC had entered into a settlement agreement with
defendant Porter shortly after filing its lawsuit in April 2001. PDC knew that it had the
burden of setting aside that settlement agreement before it could proceed with its underlying
lawsuit. After Mr. Porter made disclosures in compliance with the terms of the settlement
agreement, PDC was dissatisfied, accused Mr. Porter of fraud in inducing PDC to settle, and
sought to proceed with a TRO hearing it had requested before the settlement occurred. The
following discussion took place at hearing on August 14,2001 between PDC's attorney, Mr.
Ady, and the court:
THE JUDGE:

Well j u s t . . . And I won't quarrel with you. Let
me just speak freely so I understand what your
concerns are.
It would appear to me that you've made an
agreement and you can enforce it. You can
request your permanent injunction and then you
could sue him for fraud. But I don't know if you
have the right to consider a temporary TRO
injunctive relief if it's been eclipsed by an
agreement.

MR. ADY:

Well, but at the time that we signed this the
fraudulent inducement, then the agreement can't
operate.
All right. But you need to make a motion then to
set aside the settlement agreementCorrect
- based on his fraud. Is that correct? I would
assume.
I would think we do, sir. Yes.
Uh-huh (affirmative).

THE JUDGE:
MR. ADY:
THE JUDGE;
MR. ADY:
THE JUDGE:

R. 737, 24:14-25:10-19. (emphasis added). The court later reiterated,
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THE JUDGE:

Sure. But it's, it's , it's not, it's assumed, it's
assumed enforceable until I hear a motion on it
that it would not be. And I haven't received a
motion on it

R. 737,36:22-37:2. (emphasis added). Mr. Ady then suggested setting a hearing for PDC's
motion to set aside:
MR. ADY

THE JUDGE:

Sir, I'm wondering if it wouldn't be useful to
calendar a date for a hearing for our motion to set
aside.
Well, my habit frankly is to a, receive those
motions and read them because sometimes they
don't require a hearing....

R. 737,53:3-8.
Thus, PDC was aware and had agreed as of August 2001 that its lawsuit
underlying the settlement could not proceed unless and until it obtained a court order setting
aside the settlement. Yet, twenty-one months then passed without PDC filing any motion to
challenge the settlement agreement. It was not until Mr. Porter-tired of the matter lingering
on and wanting his laptop back and the dismissal of the case for which he bargained—filed
a motion to enforce the settlement, that PDC then filed a motion to set it aside.
After denying PDC's motion, the court was critical of PDC's failure to
prosecute the case: "This case has been inactive for over 2 years even though plaintiff claims
that material breeches of the settlement agreement by defendant occurred as early as June and
July of 2001. Plaintiff has offered no explanation for this delay." See the court's November
30,2003 ruling, R. 648 f 2. PDC, nevertheless, over the next two and one-half years failed
-15-

to do any of the additional work directed by the court to resolve the issue of whether the
settlement should be set aside. This period included deadlines set by the court after an orderto-show-cause hearing, to do discovery on the settlement and file any dispositive motions.
PDC did nothing on the case and filed no dispositve motion.
As PDC had failed to meet court deadlines established to challenge the
settlement during the five-year period since the parties had settled, defendant Porter filed a
motion to dismiss the case. The motion was unopposed by PDC and the court dismissed the
case. Again, as stated above, PDC has failed to present any justifiable excuse to the court
for its failures to prosecute the case, to renew its motion to set aside the settlement within the
time established by the court, or, as set forth in Point III below, to oppose defendant Porter's
motion to dismiss. PDC has thus failed to meet its burden on appeal, and the court should
affirm the district court's exercise of discretion in dismissing the case.
Nevertheless, PDC argues that since the court, in November 2003, denied
defendant Porter's motion to enforce the settlement as well as PDC's motion to set aside, the
onus was then on Mr. Porter, as much as PDC, to litigate the settlement. This is not correct.
As quoted above, the posture of the case outlined by the court, and agreed to by PDC, was
that the settlement had to be set aside before the underlying lawsuit could proceed. Mr.
Porter had no obligation or interest in litigating anything. He had already incurred much
more in attorney fees and costs on the matter than he could afford, and his only interest was
in receiving the benefit of the settlement to which PDC had agreed-releasing his laptop and
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dismissing the case. R. 732, 15:24-16:24. Once Jared Porter learned that experts would
have to be hired and a lot more attorney work done to get his laptop back, it was no longer
cost-effective to try and compel PDC to fulfill its promises. Mr. Porter had no duty to
prosecute. Mr. Porter was content to wait for PDC to prosecute its challenge to the
settlement. It was PDC's lawsuit and it had the burden to get an order setting aside the
settlement. As stated in Country Meadows, u[T]he duty to prosecute is a duty of due
diligence imposed on a plaintiff, not on a defendant. Country Meadows, at 1216 (citing
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah States Univ. 813 P. 2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App.) 1991.
Utah appellate courts, where appropriate, have made use of five considerations
in addition to considering a party's delay, to assist "in assessing the sufficiency of a proffered
excuse" for lack of diligence which results in dismissal. Country Meadows at 1215, Hartford
Leasing Corporation v. State, 888 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1994), These include, (1) "the
conduct of both parties"; (2) the opportunity available to each party to move the case
forward; (3) what each party has accomplished in moving the case forward; (4) the difficulty
or prejudice imposed on the opposing party by reason of the delay; and (5) "most important,
whether injustice may result from the dismissal." Id., Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co,, at
879, Country Meadows, at 1215 (Utah App. 1993). Application of these factors requires
consideration of the "'totality of the circumstances'" Country Meadows, at 1215 (quoting
Department of Social Servs. v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980)).
While no analysis of the five considerations is necessary in the case at bar since
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PDC has offered no excuse for its failure to prosecute, the considerations, nonetheless, are
helpful to understand the district court's proper exercise of discretion in the case. All five
factors support the district court's dismissal since the parties had settled and the burden was
on PDC to challenge and move to set aside the settlement agreement. Thus, under (1), PDC
did not carry its burden, while defendant Porter did nothing to impede PDC from carrying
its burden. After two years of doing nothing, PDC finally made a motion in response to Mr.
Porter's motion. However, when PDC's motion was denied, it took no further action to
challenge or set aside the settlement, ever. Under (2) and (3), PDC expressed the desire and
acknowledged its burden to set aside the settlement. It was given ample opportunity to do
so, but did not act. Mr. Porter, on the other hand, had moved the case to settlement and had
no desire or obligation to move the case anywhere else. Under (4), defendant Porter had to
wait over five years for the benefit of the settlement. His laptop computer with all his work
was unavailable and became obsolete. He had to incur a lot more in costs and attorney fees
because of PDC's refusal to abide by or promptly seek to set aside the settlement agreement.
Under (5), there is no injustice to PDC, since it settled the case. While it was dissatisfied
with the settlement and alleged fraud in inducement, if it really believed that, and wanted to
do something about it, justice allowed for that. The real injustice has been to defendant
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Porter, who, due to PDC's conduct, had to wait five years to receive the benefit of the
settlement.2
The burden was on PDC to do something about the settlement agreement if it
really wanted to move forward on its underlying lawsuit. However, PDC did nothing and
offers no excuse, let alone a justifiable excuse, why it did not act. At the time defendant
Porter moved to dismiss, five years had passed since the parties had settled and a year had
passed since the last allotted period for discovery on, and a dispositive motion of the
settlement. The district court acted properly within its discretion in dismissing the case.
POINT II
PDC'S FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT AND PROSECUTE ITS CASE WERE NOT
MADE MOOT BY PDC'S CERTIFICATE OF
READINESS FOR TRIAL.
While PDC has not met its burden on appeal, PDC does make a crafty, albeit
legally hollow argument that the court could not dismiss its case because of the court's prior
directive at the April 4, 2006 order-to-show-cause hearing to file a certificate of readiness
for trial or submit a new scheduling order. The basis for PDC's argument is that, contrary

2

While there is no injustice to PDC, defendant notes,
"[E]ven where a trial court finds facts indicating that 'injustice could
result from the dismissal of [a] case,1 it can dismiss when a plaintiff has
'had more than ample opportunity to prove his [or her] asserted interest
and simply failed to do so.'" Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App. 109 at
f28 , 46 P.3d 753, Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1216.
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to the court's statements, the court was not really confused about the status of the parties' last
stipulated extension; therefore, following the court's directive to file a certificate of readiness
for trial or a new scheduling order cured PDC's failures to prosecute over the prior five
years.
Even were PDC correct that the court was not confused on the extension at the
April 4, 2006 order-to-show-cause hearing, this would be immaterial. The court made no
finding at that time that PDC had diligently prosecuted the case, nor did it order that PDC's
case could not be the subject of a motion to dismiss for its failures. Without knowing much
at all about the history of the case at that point, the court simply told PDC that the case would
be dismissed by April 30, 2006, unless it filed a certificate of readiness for trial or a new
scheduling order. This was a necessary step to avoid dismissal at that time, but in no way
immunized PDC from dismissal for other reasons. Subsequently, in connection with
defendant's motion to dismiss, the court reviewed the entire record and based its decision on
the whole history of the case, not just on the status of one stipulated extension. Furthermore,
while the district court did not reverse any rulings it had made, contrary to PDC' s arguments,
a district court retains authority to reverse its prior non-final orders, if it sees fit. Macris v.
Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, f 29,24 P.3d 984. The court had power to entertain
and rule on a motion to dismiss, regardless of PDC's filing of a certificate of readiness for
trial.
Nonetheless, as the court explained at the August 10,2008 motion-to-dismiss
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hearing, the court believed that it was under the misimpression at the April 4,2006 hearing,
that the parties' stipulated extension was still in effect. PDC's Addendum B, R. 732,22:1525. The court's mis-impression is confirmed by the transcript of the order-to show-cause
hearing:
Okay. And then there's an extension, there's an agreement for an
extension of time to April 30th in the file, 2005. So looks like you've
agreed to, to that you have time a, until April 30th to complete
discovery. That a, stipulated extension remains in place. And a, I'll
order that a notice of readiness for trial be filed after that. Sounds like
you have some more time. Then if I don't receive a certificate of
readiness for trial or some other scheduling order by April 30th the case
will be dismissed.
R. 733, p. 6. (Emphasis added). Unfortunately, defense counsel had gone to the case's prior
courthouse for the April 4, 2006 order-to-show-cause hearing. Otherwise, he could have
cleared up the confusion, and, as he had intended, presented the history of the case, asked for
dismissal at that time, and avoided PDC's efforts.
Having failed to obtain a court order setting aside the settlement agreement,
after the order-to-show-cause hearing, PDC sought to exploit the situation and do an "endrun" around the settlement agreement and the entire civil litigation process. To defendant's
surprise, PDC filed a certificate of readiness for trial, representing that (1) all required
pleadings had been filed and the case was at issue as to all parties, (2) counsel had completed
all discovery, and (3) settlement discussions had been "pursued", but that no settlement had
taken place. R. 643. Mr. Porter then filed an objection to the certificate of readiness for
trial and his motion to dismiss. RR. 682-644. Mr. Porter pointed out that all three of
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Plaintiffs assertions were false, that the case had settled, that PDC had never obtained an
order setting aside the settlement, and because of that, PDC's underlying claims had never
been litigated, no answer to the complaint had been filed, PDC had never scheduled a Rule
26 planning meeting as would be its duty, there had been no initial disclosures, no scheduling
order, and no opportunity for discovery or motions on the merits of plaintiff s lawsuit. RR.
682, 680. The only discovery that had occurred in the case was pursuant to the settlement
agreement and it consisted of defendant's 14-hour deposition to make disclosures in
compliance with the settlement.
In any event, all of PDC's arguments about the certificate of readiness for trial
are irrelevant to the appeal at bar. As set forth above, the trial court did not base its decision
to dismiss the case on the veracity of PDC's statements in the certificate, but on the thorough
review of the record and findings in connection with Plaintiffs motion to dismiss.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ACTED WITHIN
ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PDC'S COMPLAINT
FOR FAILURE TO OPPOSE DEFENDANT PORTER'S
MOTION TO DISMISS.
Rule 41(b), as quoted above, not only provides dismissal for failure to abide
by court orders and prosecute, but for failure to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. PDC had the duty to timely oppose Mr. Porter's motion to dismiss. Rule 7(c)(1),
Utah R. Civ. P., provides in pertinent part:

-22-

Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum
in opposition.
(emphasis added).
PDC failed to oppose the motion to dismiss and has failed on appeal to meet
its burden of showing a justifiable excuse for that failure. Further, PDC has never denied
receiving the motion to dismiss and memorandum in support, and there is no doubt that PDC
did receive them. See RR. 689-683, 682-673. As set forth in the authorities quoted and
cited above, a district court has discretion to dismiss under Rule 41(b). All this was
explained during the August 10, 2006 hearing on the motion to dismiss:
You're also well within the law and discretion to dismiss it because my
motion to dismiss was unopposed by, by the plaintiff. We're here today
on that. I filed it three months ago. I mailed it to him, I faxed it to him,
I sent him a letter. He had every opportunity to challenge that motion
to dismiss but he didn't do it. So there's a second independent reason
you're well within the law and equity here to dismiss this case. And,
therefore, I would ask you to dismiss it.
PDC's Addendum B, R. 732, p. 9.
PDC and its attorney knew what was at stake in ignoring a motion to dismiss.
PDC's failure to respond was an admission of Mr. Porter's assertions that PDC had failed
to timely challenge the settlement and prosecute its case. As PDC has failed to offer a
justifiable excuse or show a clear abuse of the district court's discretion, the court should
uphold the district court's exercise of discretion in dismissing the case on this additional
ground.
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CONCLUSION
The court should uphold the district court's exercise of discretion in dismissing
plaintiff PDC's complaint. PDC has failed to meet its burden on appeal of showing a
justifiable excuse for its failures to timely challenge the parties' settlement agreement, obtain
a court order setting it aside, and prosecute its case. PDC has also failed to meet its burden
of showing a justifiable excuse for not timely opposing defendant Jared Porter's motion to
dismiss. PDC has failed in its burden to show that the district court clearly abused its broad
discretion in this matter.
WHEREFORE, defendant Jared Porter respectfully requests that the Utah
Court of Appeals uphold the district court's proper exercise of discretion in dismissing the
case.
DATED AND SUBMITTED this ^ _ day of A p ^ 1
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, 2008.
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